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Note
Rulemaking or Adjudication in Administrative
Policy Formation: Rock versus Hard Place?
The Administrative Procedure Act' imposes uniform procedural
requirements on all governmental agencies.' It provides two avenues
for the development of agency policy: rulemaking and adjudica-
tion.4 This note traces conceptual and practical problems raised by
the rulemaking/adjudication dichotomy, with particular attention
to the most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject.'
I. RULE VS. ORDER
An agency's "identity" comes from its enabling legislation, which
spells out the agency's purpose and function. Some enabling stat-
utes explain in detail when the agency must act, what it must do,
and how it must proceed.' Often such legislation leaves the agency
no choice as to the procedure for formulating policy.7 Other statutes
merely direct the agency to implement the provisions of the act,
without specifying how or when.' Statutes of the latter type embody
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as APA].
2. The legislative and judicial branches of the government, military authority, and "agen-
cies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the
parties to the disputes determined by them" are specifically excluded from the APA. Id. §
551(1). Subsequent legislation may supersede the APA if it does so expressly. Id. § 559.
3. "'Rule making' means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule."
Id. § 551(5) (1970).
4. "'Adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of an order." Id. § 551(7).
The adjudicatory procedure set forth in the APA applies only to adjudication required by
statute to be determined on a record. Id. § 554(a).
5. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
6. E.g., the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act directs the Food and Drug Administra-
tion to fix food standards on the basis of a record compiled at a formal hearing. 21 U.S.C. §
371 (1970).
7. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, for example, requires that the
Secretary promulgate mandatory safety standards according to the procedure outlined
therein. 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
8. E.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: "The commission shall also have
power . . . (g) From time to time . . . to make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
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broad congressional policy;9 the agency must fill gaps in the legisla-
tion since it cannot be administered as written. The administrative
interpretations gradually develop into a body of law." In addition,
such broad legislation usually empowers the agency to promulgate
rules in accordance with the APA."
Absent guidance in its enabling statute, the agency must look to
the APA to determine when law should be developed by rulemaking
rather than by adjudication. The APA, however, does not acknowl-
edge this problem. The APA defines "rule" as "the whole or a part
of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy ... ."I' The definition does not recognize that administra-
tive case law, evolving in adjudicatory proceedings, has future ef-
fect. Nor is this aspect of case law reflected in the definition of the
adjudicative "order": " 'order' means the whole or part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declara-
tory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making."' 3
The definition is ambiguous since "order" overlaps "rule" when an
agency statement has "particular applicability" and future effect.
Procedurally, rulemaking and adjudication are more readily dis-
tinguishable. Rulemaking directs the future conduct of a class of
persons; adjudication determines the legal status of the parties be-
fore the agency, usually with respect to events which have already
occurred. 4 Rulemaking requires publication of advance notice in
the Federal Register, 5 while an adjudication requires no notification
9. Congress created the National Labor Relations Board, for example, to define and
protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to
eliminate certain labor and management practices that harm the general welfare. Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970).
10. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting on other
grounds).
11. The NLRB is one such agency. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
13. Id. § 551(6).
14. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Adminis-
trative Policy, 78 HnAv. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]. See also 1 K.
DAVIS, TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 511 (1958).
15. The APA provides:
The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
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of parties outside the case or controversy." Interested parties have
a right to participate in a rulemaking proceeding through written or
oral submissions, 7 but may intervene in adjudications only at the
agency's discretion. 8
It may be that certain agency action must be accomplished
through the exclusive use of either rulemaking or adjudication. It
has been suggested that rulemaking is necessary when an agency
adopts or modifies policy.'9 But when the legislative intent as to
what must be done by rulemaking is unclear, many agencies consis-
tently use adjudication rather than rulemaking as the vehicle for
policy formation. Proponents of rulemaking maintain that these
agencies are promulgating rules in violation of the APA require-
ments.20
The APA definitions of "rule" and "order" indicate that Congress
intended the use of rulemaking when agencies act like legislatures,
and adjudication when they act like courts.2' But rules and orders
do not always conform to the legislative-judicial model. Rules are
prospective-but in some cases they are applied retroactively.,
Orders affect the parties before the agency-but in some cases they
are applied prospectively. 3 Some adjudications are resolved by use
of formulas," which are like rules because they articulate standards
and like orders because the standard remains flexible. But if the
formula resembles a policy pronouncement, the order may not with-
16. Id. § 554(b).
17. Id. § 554(c).
18. Id.
19. See Shapiro, supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Peck].
21. NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963).
22. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936) (amended regula-
tion given retroactive effect); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935) (administrative
regulation which creates an obligation can be retroactive when this intent appears on its face).
But cf. Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (new construction of Mineral Lands
Leasing Act could be prospective only).
23. NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) (if retroactivity works a
hardship on parties which outweighs the public end sought, prospectivity is permissible);
NLRB v. Red Rock Co., 187 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1951) (redefinition of jurisdictional requirement
did not apply to complaint entered before the order); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 453 (1962) (new procedure for assessing consent elections applied only to petitions
filed two weeks after the decision).
24. NLRB v. Hondo Drilling Co., 428 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1970) (application of eligibility
formula was not rulemaking).
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stand the objection that it is really an invalidly promulgated rule.25
Agencies must conform to Supreme Court pronouncements; this
may require reversal of prior-established agency case law in an adju-
dicatory proceeding. 6 And since agencies need not reach the same
result in all comparable cases,2 the agency is free, within the limits
of the enabling statute, to contradict its own case law.
Adjudication is like rulemaking in the sense that it can give birth
to "rules" which affect parties outside the proceeding. This is ex-
pected in a judicial setting. Those who disapprove of the formation
of policy in an adjudicative setting, however, suggest that rule-
making is the preferable method because it taps outside information
sources for the agency 2l and protects the regulated from unpublished
ad hoc policy changes.2 1
An agency is in an awkward position when its enabling legislation
does not tell it when to proceed by rulemaking. It must act within
the sometimes conceptually inadequate categories of the APA.30 It
may be difficult to determine when only rulemaking will satisfy the
need for efficient notification of the regulated and the agency's own
need for input. The agency may feel that rulemaking is an ineffi-
cient means for resolving a problem or dispute. Yet it runs the risk
of appeal and reversal on procedural grounds if it ignores the APA
requirements.
25. NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960) (court suggested that
rulemaking would have been a more appropriate means for announcing new policy, and
overruled on the merits). Contra, NLRB v. Carpenters Local 176, 276 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1960)
(court viewed same order as valid development of policy).
26. E.g., H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972) (Board order overturning
some thirty years of Board precedent was permissible in light of prior Supreme Court deci-
sions); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970) (retroactive application
of Board's new position that economic strikers had right to reinstatement was proper because
the view had been expressed earlier in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967)).
27. FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 228 (1946).
28. It has been suggested that since an agency is insulated from extensive exposure to the
field it regulates, the APA provisions for discretionary intervention by interested parties in
adjudications may not provide the full range of data needed to make an informed decision.
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 577-78 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein].
29. Id. at 576.
30. For a discussion of conceptual difficulties inherent in the categories used by adminis-
trative agencies, including the rule/order dichotomy see Bernstein, The Regulatory Pocess:
A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW & CONrTrP. PROB. 329 (1961).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY
The question of when rulemaking is required has reached the
Supreme Court only several times.3" In SEC v. Chenery Corp.
[Chenery 11,32 a public utility holding company challenged the sub-
stantive validity of the standard used to evaluate its reorganization
plan. The plan called for management trading during reorganiza-
tion, a problem the Commission had never confronted. Since there
was no pre-existing agency standard by which to judge the proposal,
the Commission relied on its own interpretation of judicial prece-
dent in the area to invalidate the plan. On appeal, the Court re-
manded the case because it appeared that the SEC had misinter-
preted the judicial standard."
The Commission reconsidered the reorganization plan and once
again rejected it, this time on the basis of its accumulated expe-
rience with utility reorganization. In Chenery H,11 the corporation
questioned the merits of the Commission's new standard and the
procedure through which the standard was formulated and applied.
The corporation argued that if the Commission wished to fashion a
standard for the future, it should be required to proceed by rulemak-
ing.
The Court held that new standards could be drawn in adjudica-
tions35 where the agency determined that a principle could not be
cast as a general rule:
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the ad-
ministrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems
which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general
rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience
with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative
judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so
specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture
within the boundaries of a general rule.36
31. Due to the highly abstract nature of the issue, these few decisions have shed more heat
than light on the problem. As Prof. Bernstein puts it, an examination of these cases "is not a
trip for the squeamish." Bernstein, supra note 28, at 573 n.5.
32. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
33. Id. at 87.
34. SEC v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
35. However, since the Commission, unlike a court, has the ability to make law prospec-
tively by rulemaking, it has less reason to do so in ad hoc litigation. Id. at 202.
36. Id. at 202-03.
1975 Note
Duquesne Law Review
The Court emphasized that inflexible technical requirements
should not prevent an agency from doing its job37 and, while policy
should be formulated by rulemaking whenever possible, the decision
to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication is primarily within the
agency's informed discretion.38
Some appellate courts cited Chenery II for the proposition that
agencies could always adopt or reverse policy in adjudications so
long as the standards pronounced were fair to the parties39 and
consistent with the enabling statute." Others interpreted it to mean
that rulemaking was mandatory except in special situations where
it would be impractical, premature, or of marginal utility.4'
Some twenty years after Chenery II the issue was still unsettled.
The Court re-examined it in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.42 and
upheld a Board order enforcing a rule promulgated in a prior adjudi-
cative proceeding. In the first adjudication, Excelsior Underwear
Inc. ,3 the National Labor Relations Board announced a require-
ment to be applied in all representation elections: in order to equal-
ize the comparative campaign strength of organizers and employers,
employers would be required to furnish unions with lists of employee
names and addresses before representation elections. The effective
date of this "rule" was set for thirty days after the decision; it was
not applied to the parties before the Board. When the Board en-
forced the Excelsior rule in a subsequent election at Wyman-Gordon
Company, the company objected that the rule had been promul-
gated in violation of the APA rulemaking requirements.
A plurality of the Court upheld the order in Wyman-Gordon but
by irreconcilably opposite reasoning. In the opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, four Justices held that the Board had vio-
37. Chenery I sanctions the use of adjudication rather than rulemaking where the agency
feels incapable of articulating a standard-but the agency's lack of experience may be one
reason to solicit information from interested parties in a rulemaking proceeding.
38. 332 U.S. at 203.
39. NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life
Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1968).
40. Optical Workers' Local 24859 v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1955) ("Board has
authority to adopt and reverse policy. . . in any manner reasonably calculated to carry out
its statutory duties.")
41. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (SEC could not set standard for disclosure without first
conducting hearing).
42. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
43. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
Vol. 13: 967
1975 Note
lated the APA by giving the Excelsior "rule" wholly prospective
effect. They sustained the rule as enforced in Wyman-Gordon, how-
ever, because it had been specifically applied to a named party
before the Board as part of an order." Three concurring Justices
viewed Excelsior as a proper adjudicatory proceeding45 which was
correctly followed in Wyman-Gordon. They cited Chenery II to sup-
port their contention that the Board had not abused its discretion
by adopting policy in an adjudication." Justice Douglas47 and Jus-
tice Harlan,48 dissenting separately, argued that the illegally-
promulgated Excelsior rule could not be redeemed in a subsequent
adjudication.
Some commentators felt that the Board won a Pyrrhic victory in
Wyman-Gordon, since six Justices had refused to endorse its prac-
tice of making wholly prospective rules in adjudicatory proceed-
ings.49 But a question remained as to how the Court would view a
procedural challenge when the agency's order was not applied pro-
spectively. What result, for example, when the Court confronted a
policy change adopted in an adjudication, binding on future con-
duct, and imposed on the parties before the agency as well? That
question reached the Court" in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Divi-
sion of Textron, Inc.51
44. 394 U.S. at 765-66.
45. The proceeding was "adjudication" within the meaning of the APA even though the
requirement was prospectively applied. Its future effect was legitimate "sunbursting." Id. at
772-73.
46. See text at notes 35-38.
47. 394 U.S. at 775.
48. Id. at 780. Justice Harlan felt that if the NLRB could enforce an invalid rule in a
subsequent adjudication, the rulemaking provisions of the APA would be completely trivial-
ized. The Court's strong objection to Excelsior's prospective effect indicated that as long as
the agency applied new requirements to the parties before it, rulemaking would not be
necessary.
If an order has no immediate effect, the parties have little incentive to pursue an expensive
appeal which could result merely in remand with instructions to the agency to reach the same
result by rulemaking. In all likelihood, the procedure would not be challenged until the rule
was applied in a later adjudication. At that point, according to the opinion of the Court in
Wyman-Gordon, the rule would be valid because it had been applied in an adjudication.
Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that the Board could continue to issue invalid rules with
assurance that they would ultimately be enforced.
49. Bernstein, supra note 28, at 609.
50. The answer was unpredictable since the Court's membership had changed since
Wyman-Gordon. While three of the six Justices who held Excelsior invalid remained on the
Court (Stewart, White & Douglas, JJ.), only two reached the same result. With them were
two concurring Justices (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.), who had emphasized the Board's discre-
tionary power to develop policy in adjudicatory proceedings.
51. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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III. THE Bell Aerospace DECISION
A. Background
The National Labor Relations Act authorizes the Board to make
rules periodically to effectuate the provisions of the Act.5" When the
Board promulgates a rule, it is directed to follow the procedure for
rulemaking outlined in the APA. The NLRA does not indicate what
situations require rulemaking. Presumably, the Board is to identify
the circumstances under which rulemaking is mandatory by refer-
ring to the APA 3; as seen above, however, the APA does not address
this issue.
The NLRB has interpreted the delegation of rulemaking author-
ity merely as a procedural option: only if it decides that rulemaking
is necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act will it utilize the
procedure prescribed by the APA. Critics of the Board's practice of
developing policy in adjudicatory proceedings believe rulemaking
should be required when the Board adopts or modifies policy."
Although the Board is not the only agency accused of avoiding the
APA requirements, 5 it bears the brunt of complaints from propo-
nents of rulemaking.5 5 The NLRB has developed a body of law
through adjudication for over thirty-five years57 and in that time has
held rulemaking proceedings only twice.55 This reluctance to codify
52. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as NLRA].
53. The House Conference Report on the administrative aspects of the Labor-
Management Relations Act stated that the words "in the manner prescribed by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act" were inserted to assure that subsequent amendment of the NLRA
would not supersede the general rules in the APA presently controlling the Board's power to
promulgate regulations. U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1143-44 (1947).
54. The Board is so notorious for promulgating rules in adjudicative proceedings that in
1964 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association unanimously passed a recom-
mendation urging the Board to utilize rulemaking procedures. 16 AD. L. REV. 77 (1964).
55. Morningside Renewal Council v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 482 F.2d 234,
240 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion) (safety standards for operating nuclear reactors should
be set in rulemaking proceeding).
56. See Kahn, NLRB and Higher Education: the failure of policymaking through
adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 63 (1973); Peck, supra note 20; Silverman, The Case for
the National Labor Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB.
L.J. 607 (1974); Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 93
(1954).
57. For an illustration of how the Board's contract bar rules evolved in case law see Peck,
supra note 20, at 739.
58. One proceeding promulgated a standard for the exercise of jurisdiction over private
colleges and universities. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,370 (1970). The other considered whether dog racing
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an established policy may be a function of the Board's unstable
composition." Or it may be that in the dynamic field of labor rela-
tions each case is so unique that elaborate statutory standards
should not be attempted; in many cases the Board can do no more
than apply the Act to the particular facts at hand. 0 Nevertheless,
the Board often states holdings broadly in individual cases in an
attempt to reduce its extraordinarily large caseload.' The Board's
critics say that more frequent promulgation of rules in accordance
with the APA could have the same effect. 62
B. "MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES"-AN ATrEMPT AT A SIMPLIFIED
STANDARD
In August, 1971, the NLRB certified Amalgamated Local No.
1286 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America as the collective bargaining representa-
tive for the twenty-five buyers at Bell Aerospace Company. The
company feared that union buyers would favor union suppliers and
refused to bargain with the union on the grounds that the buyers
were "managerial employees" outside the coverage of the NLRA.13
and horse racing should be brought under the Act. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,242 (1972).
59. The Board consists of five members appointed by the President with Senate consent.
Board members serve five-year terms, the term of one expiring each year. Reappointments
may be made. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-54 (1970). It has been suggested that the Board's doctrinal
instability reflects shifts in political power and the consequent reconstitution of the Board's
membership. "Republican Boards," for example, may emphasize freedom of contract, while
a "Democratic Board" may actively encourage collective bargaining. Winter, Judicial Review
of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 53, 64.
60. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (Board erred in holding hiring-
hall arrangement unlawful per se, since such arrangements are not unlawful unless they in
fact result in discrimination); NLRB v. Radio & Television Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961)
(Board must solve jurisdictional disputes between unions on a case-by-case basis).
61. Each fiscal year the NLRB receives more than 400,000 cases, most of them unfair labor
practice charges. Since the Board encourages voluntary disposition of cases at all stages, only
about five percent of the unfair labor practice charges filed with Regional Offices actually
percolate to the five-man tribunal. Despite the small percentage, the Board decides almost
1,000 unfair labor practice cases and more than 400 representation cases each year, and the
total flow of cases filed with the NLRB is on the increase. NLRB, THE NLRB. . . WHAT IT
IS, WHAT IT DOES (1974).
62. Peck, supra note 20, at 753.
63. Managerial employees are not expressly excluded in the Taft-Hartley Act. The draf-
ters considered this direction unnecessary, since prior to 1947 the Board consistently pre-
vented the organization of "managerial employees" either separately or as part of a rank-and-
file unit. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1141 (1947). The exclusion
reflected the Board's concept of the predominant concern of the Act-the protection of work-
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In the Board's view, only "managerial employees" who were asso-
ciated with the "formulation or implementation of labor relations
policies" were excluded from the Act. The test for affiliation with
management was whether union membership would create a "con-
flict of interest" with employees' duties to their employer. 4 The
Board held that the Act covered the buyers at Bell Aerospace Com-
pany even though they might be "managerial employees," because
the company had not shown that their organization would cause a
conflict.
The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order to
bargain,15 and certiorari was granted. 6 Like the circuit court, the
Supreme Court rejected the Board's application of the "conflict of
interest" test, 7 holding instead that the established inquiry into the
degree of authority exercised is the correct legal standard for deter-
mining whether the buyers are true "managerial employees." 8
ers. Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
64. The company had petitioned the Board to reconsider its endorsement in light of a
recent decision holding that under no circumstances could an employee be brought under the
Act once he was deemed "managerial." NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Corp., 446 F.2d 602 (8th
Cir. 1971). The Board stated that it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and would adhere to
its own decision. Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828 (1972). See 26 VAND. L. REV. 850
(1973).
65. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
66. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 414 U.S. 816 (1973).
67. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
68. Although the Board has purposely defined "managerial employee" in a vague, flexible
fashion, it has developed the meaning of the term consistently. Generally, "managerial em-
ployees" are those who "formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and
making operative the decisions of their employer." Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947).
The Board usually placed buyers who were invested with responsibility and discretion in
the "managerial" category because their interests were closely aligned with management.
E.g., Western Gear Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 272 (1966) (buyers prepared purchase orders and had
discretionary authority to pledge employer's credit up to $5,000); 'ACF Indus., Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 403 (1963) (buyers could reject bids and commit employer's credit up to $2,500);
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817 (1958) (buyers interviewed prospective suppliers,
cancelled orders and placed them with alternative vendors); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 1652 (1958) (buyers made actual purchases in amounts up to $2,500 without man-
agement approval); Mack Trucks, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1576 (1956) (in one fiscal year buyers
pledged employer's credit in amounts ranging from $800,000 to $6,000,000, negotiated prices,
changed delivery dates, and adjusted disputes with suppliers).
At Bell Aerospace Co., buyers procured inter-departmental requisitions and purchased all
the company's needs from outside sources. Unless instructed otherwise, they had discretion
to choose vendors, draft bid invitations, evaluate submitted bids, negotiate terms, and pur-
chase in amounts up to $5,000 without prior approval from a supervisor. The company
maintained that, according to Board precedent, the buyers were "managerial employees." 416
U.S. at 269-70.
Under the "conflict of interest" standard, some "managerial em-
ployees" might invoke the protections of the Act despite their align-
ment with management. It was clear to the Court that the Board's
early decisions, the purpose and legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Board's subsequent construction of the Act, and
the decisions of courts of appeals pointed to a flat exclusion of all
"managerial employees."" The case was remanded to the Board for
application of the proper legal standard.
The Court also disagreed with the circuit court's characterization
and treatment of the rulemaking issue in Bell Aerospace." The cir-
cuit court felt that while the Board could determine that buyers, or
some buyers, were not "managerial employees," to do so would
overturn established Board policy to the contrary." This change of
position would affect hundreds of thousands of buyers and employ-
ers who would be without notice or the opportunity to be heard
because the change had occurred in an adjudicatory proceeding. If
the Board wished to significantly alter the current labor-
management understanding of which employees where "manage-
rial," it would be required to conduct rulemaking proceedings. 2 The
court noted that policy-making by adjudication is often unavoidable
in unfair labor practice cases, where the parties have already acted
and the Board must resolve the dispute immediately; there is not
the same urgency in representation cases."
69. 416 U.S. at 289. See 24 CATH. L. REv. 118 (1974).
Four dissenting Justices (White, Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ.) could find no intent
to exclude "managerial employees" in either the legislative history of the Act or in subsequent
Board decisions. "Supervisory employees," a specifically defined subclass of "managerial
employees," are the only "managerial" group expressly excluded by the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (1970). The dissenters saw no reason to imply a broader exclusion when the Act was
so explicit. 416 U.S. at 297.
70. The company attacked the Board's order on the merits in the lower court; the rule-
making issue was raised by the circuit court itself.
71. Only twice had the Board addressed the question whether buyers could organize in a
separate unit; both times unionization was prohibited. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956);
American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115 (1950). The issue may have been raised so infre-
quently because the Board traditionally identified buyers with management. See note 68
supra.
72. 475 F.2d at 495-96. This was true despite evidence that the company's buyers were
not sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy to be true "managerial employees." Id. at
494.
73. In a representation proceeding the parties seek only a determination of whether the
proposed unit is "appropriate" for purposes of collective bargaining. The Board simply estab-
lishes the rights of the litigants without ordering anything to be done-much like a declara-
1975 Note
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According to the Supreme Court, the question was not whether
the Board should have resorted to rulemaking when it held that the
Act covered all "managerial employees" except those susceptible to
a "conflict of interest." Nor did the Court ask if the Board had
improperly promulgated a rule. The conclusion that the standard
was wrong made consideration of these issues unnecessary.74 Rather,
the question was whether the Board would be required to proceed
by rulemaking if it applied the proper standard to the buyers on
remand and determined they were not "managerial employees."7
The circuit court thought rulemaking was required because any
Board finding that buyers were not "managerial employees" would
be contrary to its prior decisions and would presumably be in the
nature of a general rule applicable to all other cases. The Supreme
Court, however, categorized the case as one of the situations deline-
ated in Chenery IP-where rulemaking is inappropriate and hence
not required." Precisely because there were hundreds of thousands
of buyers, whose duties vary widely depending on the industry and
the employer, it was doubtful any generalized standard would have
more than marginal utility.7 8 The Board thus had reason to proceed
tory judgment. This affects the rulemaking issue in representation cases, because declaratory
judgments are included in the definition of "order" in the APA. See text at note 13 supra. If
the Board makes declaratory judgments or their equivalent in representation proceedings,
there should be no rulemaking issue: The Board has issued an order within the meaning of
the APA. The court of appeals required rulemaking in Bell Aerospace because it focused on
how the judgment affected parties outside the proceeding. 475 F.2d at 496.
74. The implication is that the "conflict of interest" standard would be substantively
incorrect and unenforceable even if it had been formulated in a proper rulemaking proceed-
ing.
75. 416 U.S. at 291.
76. See text at notes 35-38 supra.
77. The Court indicated that it had a particular Chenery H exception in mind: " 'Or the
problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within
the boundaries of a general rule.' " 416 U.S. at 293, quoting 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947)
(emphasis by the Court). See text at notes 35-36 supra.
78. 416 U.S. at 294. The Board had argued that its Bell Aerospace holding was not
designed as a general rule, since the factors to be considered in determining if employees are
"managerial" have different weight in different contexts. For example, a $5,000 purchase
ceiling might evidence more authority where the buyer procures low rather than high priced
items. A buyer's discretionary power to choose suppliers means less when potential suppliers
are limited in number. In one company, detailed instructions from management might not
diminish a buyer's actual authority; in another, less detailed instructions could have that
effect. Brief for Petitioner at 32 n.22, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
The company contended that even though a general standard might not accommodate
fringe cases, the Board could resolve the issue for a vast majority of buyers by promulgating
a rule. In the process, the Board could decrease its own caseload. Brief for Respondent at 22.
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cautiously, developing its standard by the ad hoc method with at-
tention to the specific characteristics of the buyers in each com-
pany. The Board's judgment that adjudication best served this pur-
pose was entitled to great weight.
Industry's reliance on the Board's past decisions did not compel
a different result, since the company had not shown substantial
adverse consequences flowing from such reliance; no fines were im-
posed and no new liability was incurred for past actions undertaken
in good faith.79 In any event, such concern was premature, for the
Board had not yet finally determined the status of the buyers. The
Court concluded that the Board would not abuse its discretion if it
made the determination in an adjudicatory proceeding.
C. ANALYSIS OF Bell Aerospace-THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
The Court in Bell Aerospace found that the question whether
certain buyers are "managerial" came within a Chenery II exception
to the rulemaking requirement."0 But Chenery II concerns the
agency's pre-judicial review policy formulation; a reviewing court
uses the Chenery II criteria to determine if the agency abused its
discretion by making policy pronouncements in a prior adjudicatory
proceeding. The Court never reached that inquiry in Bell Aerospace
because the policy itself was incorrect. The Court, unconcerned with
what the Board should have done, looked ahead to how the Board
should proceed on remand.8 ' It examined this question in light of the
function the Board would perform, and thus adopted a functional
approach.
The Court held that rulemaking would not be required if the
Board finally classified the buyers as "non-managerial." 2 The im-
plication is that extending the Act's coverage to the buyers would
be permissible; it would not constitute a change in policy, despite
a long line of contrary precedent, because the standard would not
be changed. Bell Aerospace did not present a Chenery II situation,
79. 416 U.S. at 295. When retroactive policy-making has a disastrous impact upon a party
innocent of any conscious misconduct, an order may be applied prospectively. NLRB v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). In extreme cases, the court will call for
rulemaking. NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966). These cases turn
on general equitable principles rather than the requirements of the APA.
80. See note 77 supra.
81. 416 U.S. at 294.
82. Id. at 295.
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where the agency had exercised its law-declaring function prior to
any review by the Court. Rather, the Court here announced the
correct legal standard through its independent scope of review; 3 on
remand the Board was only to use the standard. In other words, it
was to perform its law-applying function, the exercise of which is
consistently affirmed by courts so long as it has a rational basis.,
In the Court's view, "policy" is the standard itself, rather than
the way the standard is applied. Since rulemaking is at issue only
when an agency changes or adopts policy, it follows that the issue
is relevant only when the agency executes its law-declaring function.
When the agency engages in law-application alone, Bell Aerospace
indicates the rulemaking question is misplaced. 5 Of course, law-
applying could border on law-declaring if the agency uses the stan-
dard in an unusual fashion. The question in the wake of Bell
Aerospace is how far the agency may bend the standard before it has
in fact changed policy and resurrected the rulemaking issue.
Bell Aerospace reflects a belief, first articulated in Chenery 11, s8
that agencies have sufficient expertise" to determine whether adju-
dicative proceedings can provide the information necessary for a fair
consideration of the issues. 8 The presumption of expertise contrasts
with a theory shared by some lower courts that above all the admin-
istrative process must satisfy the agency's constant need for input
from many varied sources" and direct the regulated through ade-
quate notice.'"
83. Statutory interpretation is a question of law within the exclusive competance of
courts. The court may reject the Board's analysis and independently establish the meaning
of statutory terms. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 115 (1944).
84. E.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
85. It has been suggested, however, that the law-declaring and law-applying labels are so
amorphous as to be interchangeable at the whim of the court. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 551-52 (1972).
86. 332 U.S. at 203.
87. Some commentators feel that reviewing courts defer to agency expertise to the point
of abdication. See generally Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 471-75 (1954).
88. 416 U.S. at 295.
89. See Hess & Clark, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (agency must give parties
adequate notice and in turn receive response sufficient to raise the material issues); Hill v.
FPC, 335 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1964) (suggests that agency might conduct its rate-making in
two stages: one providing affected parties the opportunity to inform the agency of special facts
it might find useful, and another, following the announcement of the standard, allowing the
parties a reasonable chance to satisfy any burden imposed).
90. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (con-
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Bell Aerospace may evidence tacit disapproval of this movement
among the lower courts. It suggests that in the future the Court's
appraisal of the law developed by the Board will be more substan-
tive than procedural,9 because it makes the Board virtually imper-
vious to procedural attack on law-application. If the Board applies
the standard incorrectly, a court might reverse its decision on the
merits. But if the Board has done no more than apply the proper
standard improperly, Bell Aerospace seems to preclude a challenge
based on the rulemaking issue even if the Board's decision affects
parties outside the proceeding."
The Court may have reached this result because the Board's noto-
riously settled habits make the rulemaking issue academic 3 in all
but the most dramatic cases. Or it could be a recognition that the
Board cannot effectively perform its statutory mandate within the
framework of the APA, particularly in representation cases." On the
curring opinion) (administration of Clean Air Act is so critical to the public at large that a
limited right of cross-examination and opportunity to challenge the Administrator's assump-
tions should be provided at hearings); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d
Cir. 1972) (directive issued by Secretary which changed the rights of aliens invalidated
because it was adopted without prior publication in the Federal Register).
91. It has been suggested that when the rulemaking issue is raised the real villain is
usually the agency's substantive inconstancy. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Pol-
icy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 529 (1970).
92. The Court might have softened the blow it dealt proponents of rulemaking by permit-
ting the Board to choose its method for developing policy, provided it explained its
choice-particularly in cases where information-gathering is essential and the litigants do not
represent the full range of possibilities involved. The Court frequently demands explanations
from agencies on other matters to determine whether they have strayed from the bounds of
their enabling statute. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973)
(Commissioner must justify charging same rates for reduced services); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (although formal findings not required, Secretary
must show that only one possible construction route existed); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941) (Board must explain basis for ordering back pay remedy).
Such a requirement might force the Board to weigh more carefully the efficacy of the
proceeding it chooses, and might actually result in more rulemaking.
93. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 620.
94. Before the NLRB can certify a bargaining representative, it must investigate the
petition requesting the election and, if necessary, hold a hearing. The investigation deter-
mines, among other things, whether the Board has jurisdiction to conduct an election,
whether the election is sought in an appropriate unit of employees, whether the representative
named in the petition is qualified, and whether there are any pre-existing barriers to the
election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970). The Board has a statutory duty to follow this procedure
"in each case." Id. § 159(b).
Over the years the Board has purposely failed to formulate general identifying features of
an "appropriate" bargaining unit, since what is "appropriate" varies in different contexts.
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other hand, Bell Aerospace may be a deliberate attempt to lift the
conceptual fog which has beclouded the issue since Wyman-Gordon.
Justice Harlan cautioned in Wyman-Gordon that "[o]ne cannot
always have the best of both worlds. Either the rule-making provi-
sions are to be enforced or they are not."" Congress designed the
APA rulemaking procedure with good intentions. One crucial omis-
sion-when rulemaking must be used-created a maze of concep-
tual and practical problems. Strict adherence to the APA require-
ments obliges agencies to choose between a rock and a hard place:
they must be faithful to the APA at the risk of wasting time, money,
and human resources, or follow their own instincts and face the
consequences on judicial review. The functional approach in Bell
Aerospace may reflect sympathy for the agencies' dilemma and a
movement toward simplification of the rulemaking issue."
M. Beth Troiano
Generally, employees with substantially similar interests concerning wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions are grouped together in a bargaining unit. The Board also considers the desires
of the employees concerned, the extent to which the employees are organized, and any history
of collective bargaining. NLRB, A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO BASIC LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT 9 (1971).
In this setting, rulemaking may be inappropriate and even counter-productive, since in
some instances the statute requires quick dispatch of petitions. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C)
(1970). It might be argued, however, that before a representation question exists, a determina-
tion must be made whether the employees are covered by the Act at all. This might be
expedited by promulgation of a general standard for industries where the management-
employee hierarchy is consistent from company to company. This was the position taken by
the circuit court in Bell Aerospace. See text at note 73.
95. 394 U.S. at 781. It might be argued that Justice Harlan was wrong in characterizing
rulemaking and adjudication as an "either/or" imperative. The adjudicatory procedure of the
APA includes some features of rulemaking; the only difference between the two is that these
features are discretionary in adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970).
96. Cf. Professor Davis' suggestion that borderline cases should not be saddled with APA
labels. He advocates a study of the practical procedural needs in hybrid situations where
rulemaking is a possibility, without characterizing the activity as either rulemaking or adjudi-
cation. 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.01 (Supp. 1965).
